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The ill-fated action at Dieppe in August 1942 is most often remembered for the heavy casualties 
suffered by the Canadian land forces deployed in the 
assault and the political controversy that followed 
this ‘military debacle’. Lingering doubts over the 
rationale for the raid, and persistent statements 
that lives were lost in vain, continue to this day. But 
the Dieppe Raid was much more than casualties 
and questionable military decision making. It had 
immediate and valuable implications on the planning 
and conduct of future Allied amphibious operations, 
particularly the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944.
 Operation Jubilee was the first joint operation of 
consequence conducted by British and Commonwealth 
forces in the European theatre during the Second 
World War. It was joint because the three services 
– the navy, army and air force – planned and 
executed the raid in concert with each other. Sadly, 
for the Allied forces involved, it also demonstrated 
just how unprepared they were in 1942 for joint co-
ordination at the operational level of war. In many 
respects, the raid took the form of three separate 
services executing pre-arranged single-service plans 
that at best were loosely co-ordinated. So long as 
their activities went according to plan, which was 
the case for the navy and the air force, they were 
successful. Missing was the flexibility of response 
that is essential for effective impromptu action from 
one or more service when enemy activity or other 
unexpected developments disrupt pre-planned 
operations. The post-raid Dieppe Report by the 
Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, makes for interested reading on how the 
British and, subsequently, the Anglo-American Allies 
identified the key elements required for successful 
joint and combined operations.
 Leigh-Mallory’s report focuses on the conduct of 
the air operations but it also addresses how air forces 
can best be used in future operations with the navy 
and the army in both pre-arranged and impromptu 
actions. For Leigh-Mallory it all begins with effective 
command and control. RAF doctrine also emphasized 
the importance of co-ordinating the entire air effort 
– fighters, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, etc. 
– from a central point. Fighter Command’s ground 
control organization was used for this purpose and 
it proved very successful in co-ordinating the various 
offensive and defensive air operations during the 
Dieppe Raid. A system of forward air control was also 
established using radio links onboard headquarters 
ships. This enhanced the flexibility of the air forces 
by linking centralized control with decentralized 
delivery. Moreover, it was on the basis of the success 
achieve by the air forces during the Dieppe Raid that 
the air plan for Operation Overlord was devised.
 The Dieppe Raid also highlighted a number of 
other important factors that affected the nature of the 
contribution made by air forces in joint operations. 
The primary importance of air superiority to all other 
air operations, the impermanence of close support 
and the many difficulties of target identification, 
the benefits of an indirect application of air power 
through dislocation rather than destruction of 
enemy forces, and the pressing need to strengthen 
cross-service understanding and develop common 
operating procedures, all feature in the lessons 
identified by Leigh-Mallory and the air staff from 
the Dieppe Raid. Leigh-Mallory is also adept at 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of air 
operations in a joint campaign and drawing the 
correct lessons on how to maximize success and 
minimize inherent weaknesses. His conclusions are 
particularly apposite and many of the observations 
made in his Dieppe Report had direct impact in both 
the air plan and the wider planning for D-Day and 
the Normandy Campaign.
 The Dieppe Report, therefore, is one of the 
more important ‘lessons learned’ documents of the 
Second World War. It established a clear conceptual 
framework, based on hard earned and costly 
experience, for joint and combined operations 
that were the pre-requisites for an Allied victory in 
Europe.
      David Ian Hall
(David Hall is an Air Warfare Historian on the Higher 
Command and Staff Course at the Joint Services Command 
and Staff College, part of the UK Defence Academy, 
Shrivenham.)
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Sir, 
 I have the honour to forward herewith my 
Report on the part taken by the Air Forces in the 
DIEPPE Operation on 19th August, 1942. 
 2. This Operation involved landings at 
Dieppe by our troops at first light followed by 
a withdrawal about mid-day. The Air Forces 
involved operated most intensively throughout 
the day from dawn until late into the afternoon. 
As the withdrawal was made on the same day as 
the landing a far heavier strain was imposed on 
the Air Forces than would have been the case had 
our occupation of Dieppe been more prolonged. 
 3. Our attacks from the sea were made 
under the supporting fire of destroyers only 
against strong and well organised shore defences. 
Every effort was made therefore to provide 
maximum air support and air cover during the 
initial assault. 
 4. This Air Support under fighter cover 
compromised airborne smoke and bombing 
attacks on enemy battery positions and the 
shooting up of the enemy’s defences by cannon 
Hurricanes. Of these, smoke was by far the most 
effective. It was laid by Bostons and Blenheims 
dropping 100lb. phosphorus smoke bombs from 
about 50 feet. 
 5. The main landing was timed for 0520 
hours and from 0510 to 0600 hours the smoke 
from these bombs covered the front of the 
Eastern Headland overlooking Dieppe. Both 
the Naval and Military Force Commanders 
accompanying the expedition report that no 
intense fire came from this Eastern Headland 
until the smoke had cleared. From then onward 
there was intensive fire from that direction. A 
further sortie of smoke aircraft was recalled as 
a result of a signal from the Military Commander 
requesting cessation of air support against 
Bismark and Rommel. It subsequently transpired 
that our troops had not advanced as far towards 
the Eastern Headland as was then thought and 
smoke was in fact still urgently required. When 
further smoke was finally requested only a few 
smoke bombing aircraft were available as the 
remainder were loaded with SCI for the final 
smoke curtain to cover the withdrawal. The few 
available aircraft were however dispatched to the 
Eastern Headland. During our final withdrawal a 
smoke curtain laid across the frontage of Dieppe 
again proved most effective in covering our ships. 
 6. Bombing attacks on battery positions 
were not as effective as smoke. I had reckoned on 
certain batteries opening fire on their SOS lines 
after our flank landings had begun at 0450, but 
these were very slow in getting into action. They 
were not firing therefore when our initial bombing 
attacks were made in the half light at the time of 
our main assault and the Bombers thus found it 
extremely difficult to locate their targets. 
 7. Cannon Hurricane attacks against 
defences along the front of the main beaches in 
support of the assault were extremely successful 
though their attacks lasted only ten minutes. 
The Naval and Military Force Commanders paid 
tribute to the magnificent timing of this attack, 
and reported that these Fighters completely 
SECRET          Headquarters No.11 
Group
Royal Air Force
Uxbridge, Middlesex
5 September 1942
Dieppe Report
Covering Letter by Air Force Commander
The seafront in Dieppe photographed in March 1946.
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diverted enemy fire from our assaulting Infantry. 
Unfortunately our Infantry touched down on 
the beaches a few minutes late. They were thus 
not able to take full advantage of the Fighters’ 
presence, and when the Fighters had concluded 
their attacks were subjected to heavy fire from 
houses along the front. 
 8. It was intended to employ Bombers 
against any enemy reinforcements making 
for Dieppe but none were located. Insistent 
demands were made for continued attacks 
against enemy gun positions. Bombers proved to 
be quite ineffective for this task although in the 
circumstances it was the only use to which they 
could be put. 
 9. Cannon Hurricanes throughout did 
magnificent work, especially during the final 
stage of the withdrawal when attacking machine 
and heavier gun posts on the Headlands flanking 
Dieppe. These attacks temporarily diverted fire, 
thereby assisting our troops to disengage and to 
re-embark. 
 10. The most satisfactory part of the 
Operation from the Air Force point of view was 
the cover given to the expedition. The earlier 
fighter cover sorties left ground in the dark, and 
arrived over Dieppe punctually at first light. They 
patrolled between about 3,000 and 6,000 feet. 
This worked well, as enemy aircraft came low, 
in attempts to bomb and shoot up our ships. 
Later, as bombers appeared, I was informed that 
they were flying between 10,000 and 12,000 feet, 
some dropping their bombs from these heights, 
and others diving down. I adjusted the heights of 
my patrols accordingly. I also learned that Focke 
Wulfs were flying at about 15,000 feet and Spitfire 
IX Squadrons were ordered to patrol above them. 
These changes in tactics worked well and in all 
some 45 Bombers were destroyed, 11 probably 
destroyed and 54 damaged. That only one major 
vessel in the expedition was seriously damaged 
throughout the day can be attributed to the 
excellent work of the Fighter Cover Squadrons. 
 11. The Air/Sea Rescue organisation as a 
whole worked very well. Some 20 pilots all told 
were picked up from the sea. It is regretted that 
Dover should have lost three out of their five 
rescue boats but it was quite impossible to keep 
continuous track of their activities. Whilst under 
the Fighter screen they were adequately protected 
but at times they gallantly went beyond this cover 
and suffered casualties. 
 12. An unsatisfactory feature of the Operation 
was the low standard of aircraft recognition 
displayed by friendly gun crews. Our own aircraft 
were very frequently fired on and suffered 
casualties. There are two obvious remedies for 
this. Naval gunners should be given intensive 
training in aircraft recognition, and selected 
personnel skilled in the recognition of aircraft 
should be carried in each ship. The Royal 
Observer Corps is the most suitable source for 
providing experts for this work. 
 13. I consider that the total casualties we 
suffered in this Operation were remarkably light 
in view of the number of Squadrons taking part 
and the intensity of the fighting. Details given in 
Appendix “C” reveal that the highest casualties 
per Squadron were 2.5 in the Army Co-operation 
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, and the 
lowest .84 per Squadron of the Fighter Cover. 
 14. My main conclusions from the day’s 
operations are:
(i) That smoke either dropped or laid from 
aircraft is of the highest value in a combined 
operation of any kind. I could quite easily 
have done with treble the number of smoke 
aircraft. 
(ii) That such an Operation facilitates 
fighting at altitudes best suited to our present 
equipment. 
(iii) That with the present relative strengths 
in aircraft, adequate cover can be provided 
for an expedition of this nature. Had the 
battle been more prolonged my Squadrons 
would have been in a better conditions than 
the enemy to continue on the following day. 
Reports since received indicate that the 
German Air Force on the Western Front lost 
between 150 and 200 aircraft. Although many 
of our pilots had done as many as five sorties, 
there was no undue sign of fatigue. 
(iv) We gained much valuable information 
concerning the forward control of aircraft, 
both as regards Cover Squadrons and 
Close Support aircraft. Controllers in the 
Headquarters Ships were of the greatest 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
Fo
rc
es
 P
ho
to
 U
ni
t
P
M
R
 8
4-
30
7
3
Leigh-Mallory: Air Operations at Dieppe
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003
58
assistance to the Fighter pilots, and this 
system calls for a wider application in future. 
15. I cannot speak too highly of the way on which 
all ranks of the Royal Air Force played their part 
in this battle. 
16. I  am forwarding  separate ly  a  l i s t 
of recommendations for decorations and 
General Outline
 1. Operation “JUBILEE” was a raid against 
occupied territory with the purpose of capturing 
by assault and occupying for a limited period, 
the town of DIEPPE. Military tasks in the area 
of DIEPPE included the destruction of local 
defenses, power stations, dock installations – the 
capture of prisoners and the destruction of the 
aerodrome installations near the town. It was 
also intended to capture and to remove German 
Invasion barges and other crafts in the harbour. 
 2. The operation was planned to take 
place on the first suitable morning for such a 
landing between the 18th and the 23rd August. 
The expedition sailed from the area of the 
PORTSMOUTH Command in a succession of 
groups starting at civil twilight on the evening of 
the 18th August.
 3. The Naval, Military and Air Forces 
assigned to this operation are set out in 
Appendices A and B to this report. A Sketch map 
of the operation is attached at Appendix E [not 
reproduced].
 4. The plan prepared jointly by the three 
Force Commanders involved a landing on 
the outer flanks of DIEPPE at “ORANGE” 
and “YELLOW” beaches by Nos. 4 and 3 
Commanders, whose tanks were to neutralise 
enemy Battery positions 6 miles to the East and 
West of DIEPPE. At the same time a Regiment 
of the 2nd Canadian Corps was to be landed to 
secure “GREEN” Beach three miles to the west 
of Dieppe, and to attack objectives on the West 
outer perimeter of the town (HINDENBURG). 
Simultaneously the Royal Regiment of Canada 
was to secure “BLUE” Beach 1½ miles to the East 
of DIEPPE, and objectives on the East flank of 
the outer perimeter, i.e. BISMARK. Half an hour 
after the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and Essex 
Scottish Regiment with the Camerons of Canada 
were to make frontal assaults on “RED” and 
“WHITE” Beaches in front of the town of DIEPPE. 
This frontal assault was to have been supported 
Report by the Air Force Commander 
on the Combined Operation Against 
Dieppe - August 19th, 1942. 
Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the author of this report, was 
the Air  Force Commander during the Dieppe operation.
Mentions in connection with this very memorable 
engagement. 
Your Obedient Servant,
T. Leigh-Mallory
Air Marshal,
Air Force Commander
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by an armoured detachment of 18 tanks. Later 
a Royal Marine Commando was to land near the 
Harbour of DIEPPE to demolish objectives in the 
Dock area. A further echelon of tanks was then 
to be landed making a total force of 38 tanks. It 
was intended, when the tasks ashore had been 
completed, to withdraw the whole force for re-
embarkation at about 1100 hours.
Air Support
 Air support was to be provided throughout 
the operation as follows:
Fighter Cover
(i) Fighter cover and general protection 
for the expedition throughout the hours 
of daylight. The primary task of this cover 
was to protect the expedition against air 
attack. It was considered that the two most 
dangerous periods in regard to attack from 
the air would be the landing and withdrawal. 
It was, therefore, decided that the strength 
of this fighter cover should vary from 2 to 6 
squadrons during the different phases of the 
operation, with such reinforcement as might 
prove necessary. 
Close Support
(ii)  (a) Close support, bombing and low 
flying fighter attacks on selected targets were 
to be made in direct support of the assault, 
occupation and withdrawal. 
(b) Smoke laying aircraft were to be used to 
neutralize defences, both in accordance with 
the pre-arranged plan and subsequently as 
required at the request of the Military Force 
Commander.
(c) Day Bomber Squadrons were to be 
employed to attack both pre-arranged targets 
and requested targets. 
Reconnaissance
(iii)(a) Tactical Reconnaissance was to 
be made over the area of the operation 
including the lines of approach of any enemy 
reinforcement. 
(b) Coastal ASV reconnaissance from 
Cherbourg to Boulogne was to be maintained 
throughout the night prior to the assault. 
(c) Fighter anti-surface vessel reconnais-
sance patrols were to be maintained 
throughout daylight hours. 
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Strategical Bombing
(iv)  It had been agreed between the 
three Force Commanders not to lay on 
any preliminary or diversionary effort with 
bombers prior to the assault in order not to 
jeopardise surprise. A strategical bombing 
attack was, however, planned against the 
enemy aerodrome of ABBEVILLE, with a 
view to interfering with the operation of his 
defending fighters. This attack was to coincide 
with the main withdrawal from the Beaches 
at which time considerable interference was 
anticipated from fighters operating from the 
ABBEVILLE area. 
Disposition of the Air Forces
in No.11 Group
 6. The following forces were available:
Day fighter forces
 50 Squadrons (Cover)
 6 Squadrons Close Support
Day Bomber forces
 2 Squadrons
Hurricane Bomber forces
 2 Squadrons
Army Co-operation forces
 4 Squadrons
“Smoke” forces
 3 Squadrons
These forces were disposed as set out in the 
Order of Battle, at Appendix ‘A’ to this report.
 7.  The assembly of these forces involved 
internal moves of Squadrons within No. 11 
Group and the reinforcement of the Group by 
15 Squadrons from outside. These extensive 
movements were carried out on the 14th and 15th 
August. Detail of the Squadron and necessary 
maintenance unit moves were as follows:
Intake of Units
into No. 11 Group
Internal
Movements into
No. 11 Group
Fighter Squadrons 17 17
Servicing Echelon - 8
Squadron
Transports 4.5 9.5
Petrol Tankers 7 12
Starter Trolleys 32 116
Echelons without
air lift - 6
Squadrons without
air lift - 6
Squadrons with
air-lift - 11
Ammunition
20 mm
Ball
20 mm
HE/1 .303 AP
.303
Incend.
20 mm
Links
727,200 727,200 7,484,400 2,474,800 1,454,400
Petrol
(100 Octane)
712,000 gallons
Enemy Dispositions
 9. The German Air Force had approximately 
260 frontline single engined aircraft between 
Brest and Texel. These were disposed as follows:
Holland    40
Pas de Calais   125
Brest to Fecamp  95
 10. The German policy since June this year 
has been to concentrate these air forces on a 
few aerodromes along the Western Front. The 
German system of reinforcement is flexible up 
to a point, with extreme mobility of units from 
one place to another. On the other hand he finds 
difficulty in adapting his control areas quickly to 
these reinforcements. 
 11. Apart from the reconnaissance units 
and a small number of aircraft used for anti-
shipping, the whole of the German bomber force 
on the Western Front has been in use by night 
only. This force was disposed mainly in the 
Dutch bases at EINDHOVEN, SOESTERBERG, 
GILZE RIGEN and DEELEN. It numbered some 
120 long range bombers with a further 100 at 
BEAUVAIS, CREIL, CHATEAUDUN, CHARTRES 
and RENNES. Reports from Pilots during the 
Operation JUBILEE indicate that a small number 
of bombers from reserve training units were 
brought into action. It was considered unlikely 
that he would be able to bring his fighters from 
as far West as Brest or as far North as Holland 
early in the operation. Thus the Fighter forces 
likely to oppose us in the early stages were from 
the ABBEVILLE area – 50, BEAUMENT-LE-
ROGER area – 50, CHER-BOURG area – 20, 
together with possible reinforcements from ST. 
OMER and COURTRAI – approximately 30 and 
45 respectively. 
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Command
 12. Captain J. H. Hallett, R. N. was the Naval 
Force Commander. 
 Major-General F. N. Roberts, MC was the 
Military Force Commander. 
 Air Marshal T.L. Leigh-Mallory, CB, DSO, Air 
Officer Commanding No. 11 Group, was the Air 
Force Commander. 
Operational Control
 13. Control of all air forces was exercised 
direct by the Air Force Commander from his 
operational Headquarters at Uxbridge. Aircraft 
were despatched on instructions issued from No. 
11 Group Operations Room through the normal 
Group to Sector, Sector to Squadron Dispersion 
Point channels. The Force Commanders afloat 
were able to ask at any time for special air 
support from bombers or fighters by means of 
the W/T link provided between Portsmouth and 
the Headquarters Ship, and a listening watch 
maintained at No. 11 Group Headquarters. 
 14. The lowest Squadron in the Fighter Cover 
operated on No. 11 Group Guard No. 1 frequency 
so that the Fighter Controller in either of the 
Headquarters Ships could communicate with the 
Squadrons of the Fighter Cover. 
 15. All outgoing Close Support Fighter 
sorties called the Headquarters Ship by VHF 
R/T when approaching the enemy coast. The 
Fighter Controller in the Headquarters Ship 
then, at the request of either the Military or Naval 
Commanders re-directed Fighter sorties to attack 
any suitable alternative target which the situation 
demanded. 
 16. Despite the fact that a very large number 
of Squadrons were being used throughout the 
operation (over 60 squadrons) this method of 
control worked admirably. During the whole 
course of this very gruelling test of the normal 
ground control organisation in No. 11 Group 
there was no breakdown. 
 17. This proved conclusively that the existing 
Fighter ground control organisation, although 
primarily designed for defensive purposes, 
provides all the facilities required for the 
direction of offensive operations within normal 
fighter range. The co-ordination of the Air Force 
effort from a central point is essential. The Group 
Operations Room with its extensive network of 
communications augmented by advanced W/T 
and R/T communication with local Commanders 
in the expedition proved to be ideal. 
 18. The local control by the Headquarters 
Ships proved equally successful. The bottom 
Squadron of all Fighter Cover formations 
operated on No. 11 Group Guard I frequency, and 
were directed on to enemy aircraft by a Controller 
in Headquarters Ship No.2. Close Support 
Squadrons operated on a Tangmere Sector 
Operational frequency and were directed on to 
targets as required by the Military Commander 
by a Controller in Headquarters Ship No.1. Thus 
the two Headquarters Ships accompanying the 
expedition were used to assist in the control of 
air forces as would an AASC during a land battle.
 19. In the majority of cases Close Support 
Fighter Pilots had been briefed, as to the targets 
to be attacked, before leaving the ground, but 
experience gained during the operation showed 
conclusively that it was possible to re-direct 
Fighters or to give them assistance in finding their 
target by local direction. Similarly Fighters were 
frequently assisted in sighting enemy aircraft by 
This photo of the Dieppe coastline was taken during the raid on 19 August 1942.
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the running commentary given by the controller 
in Headquarters Ship No. 2. There is no doubt 
that this local control was largely responsible 
for the high percentage of interceptions made 
on enemy aircraft, thus greatly minimising the 
effectiveness of enemy air attack on ships and 
troops.
 20. To summarise – the system of control 
from the Group, through Sectors, and through 
the Headquarters ships, adequately met all 
requirements. The excellent communications and 
flexible control facilities of the normal Fighter 
organisation at home proved most efficient for 
such combined operations. 
Tactical Reconnaissance
 21. Tactical Reconnaissance units suffered 
a higher casualty rate than any other type. This 
was due to the deep penetration required of them 
which necessitated their patrolling well beyond 
the Area of Fighter Cover. The coast roads leading 
to Dieppe were reconnoitred every half hour, 
and those from Amiens, Rouen, Yvetot and Le 
Havre, places from which reinforcements might 
be expected, every hour. 
 22. Aircraft took off from GATWICK, flew to 
the Dieppe area via the BEACHY HEAD route, 
made contact with the Command Ship, and then 
proceeded on their allotted tasks. On completion 
of each sortie Tactical Reconnaissance pilots flew 
sufficiently near to the ship to ensure satisfactory 
R/T transmission of any information they had. 
They then returned immediately to GATWICK 
and passed their information by telephone to the 
Air Force Commander.
 23. The only movement worthy of note was 
that of about five light tanks approaching Dieppe 
reported at 1210 hours. 
 24. The range of the HF fitted in the Tactical 
Reconnaissance aircraft proved inadequate. 
ASV Reconnaissance Patrols
 25. Aircraft of Coastal Command maintained 
ASV search patrols throughout the hours of 
darkness on the flanks of the expedition during 
the passage. No sightings were made. 
General Narrative
 26. The operation is conveniently divided into 
five distinct phases. The first covers the outward 
passage and the landings on various beaches. 
The second covers the period when progress was 
being made towards the predetermined objectives 
ashore. The third phase covers the withdrawal 
of landing parties to their beaches. The fourth 
period extends to the time when the withdrawal 
was complete. The fifth phase covers the return 
passage to England. 
Time
(2000 hours) 27. The expedition sailed 
from the area of the Portsmouth Command in a 
succession of Groups on the evening of the 18th 
August, headed by the destroyer “CALPE”.
(2130 hours) 28. Shortly before dark the 
convoy, which consisted of 217 craft in all, 
steamed past the “CALPE” (Headquarters Ship 
No. 1) to be checked. 
(0115 hours) 29. In the early hours of the 
19th August, the “CALPE” led the way through an 
enemy minefield, which had already been swept 
by a flotilla of mine-sweepers from Newhaven. A 
quarter of an hour later the whole convoy was 
safely through the minefield but it was noticed 
that the LCTs had lagged some way behind. 
(0300 hours) 30. Shortly after 0300 hours 
the first landing craft were lowered from their 
Refuelling a Canadian Spitfire. Nine Canadian 
squadrons took part in Operation Jubillee, including 
six Spitfire squadrons, two of Mustangs, and one of 
Bostons.
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parent ships. The lighthouse on the cliff outside 
DIEPPE was then visible. Up to this time the 
outward passage was comparatively uneventful, 
but a misfortune now occurred.
(0320 hours) 31. T h e  l a n d i n g  c r a f t 
conveying No. 3 Commando, which had been 
detailed to attack “YELLOW” Beach (6 miles East 
of DIEPPE) came into contact with an enemy 
convoy which included armed trawlers, and a 
number of our small craft were sunk. These 
losses resulted in the failure to subdue coast 
defence batteries to the East of DIEPPE.
 32. There was no other enemy activity 
throughout the night and no attempt was made 
by the enemy to reconnoitre for our approaching 
expedition. It would seem, therefore, that the 
force was assembled and dispatched without 
disclosure. It would have achieved complete 
tactical surprise if No. 3 Commando had not 
unfortunately been intercepted by the enemy 
trawlers en route. 
Phase 1  (0445 – 0550 hours)
 33. Despite the chance contact with enemy 
ships en route, the forces arrived at DIEPPE 
approximately on time, and the initial naval 
bombardment of selected objectives was carried 
out as arranged. 
 34. In the opening attack, escort was provided 
for smoke carrying aircraft of Bomber and Army 
Co-operation Commands laying a smoke screen 
over the Cliff Headland to the East of Dieppe 
Harbour. This was most effective lasting from 
0510 to 0600 hours. Intruder aircraft engaged 
each of the two gun Batteries to the South of 
Dieppe with bombs and machine guns. Hurricane 
Bombers, Fighters and Spitfires attacked the 
coastal emplacements, and beach defences. 
Cannon fighters provided direct support to our 
troops as they landed at “RED” and “WHITE” 
Beaches in front of DIEPPE and were successful 
in centralising enemy fire along the front from 
A grainy air photo of Dieppe taken during the raid.
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Above: This group of pilots from No.401 Spitfire 
Squadron, commanded by Squadron Leader Keith 
Hodson, was photographed on the day of the 
Dieppe assault as the pilots waited for their aircraft 
to be refuelled in between flights. Shown in the 
group are (l.-r.) Flight Sergeant Ed Gimbel, who had 
shared the probable destruction of two Fw.190s two 
days previously, F/L Jim Whitham, who shared the 
destruction of another Fw.190 on the same day and 
who probably destroyed one Fw.190 and damaged 
another on the day of the Dieppe affair, Flight Sgt. 
Bob Reesor, who also scored a probable earlier in 
the week, P/O B. “Scotty” Murray, who shared the 
destruction of a Fw.190 with F/L Whitham two days 
before the Dieppe show and who scored a probable 
and a damaged on the day of the big air battles.
Left: P/O B. “Scotty” Murray just back from a flight 
on the day of the Dieppe air battles. On that day, he 
scored a probable and a damaged during one flight. 
Two days earlier, he had shared in the destruction 
of a Fw.190 with F/L Jim “Whit” Whitham while the 
squadron was escorting Flying Fortresses of the 
USAAF to Rouen.
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0515 to 0525. During the landings there was 
little opposition from enemy aircraft. 
 35. In phase I our surface forces kept to 
their time table despite shelling by enemy shore 
batteries. Batteries situated to the south of the 
town were slow to commence firing but when they 
did were particularly destructive. Further smoke 
screens were requested to cover our landings, a 
necessity which had already been anticipated and 
additional smoke aircraft were already on their 
way to the scene of action. 
Phase 2  (0550 – 0730 hours)
(0640 hours) 37. The Western Commando 
had been completely successful in overcoming 
the battery position at HESS and killing all the 
personnel. The final assault on this position 
was assisted by a Squadron of Spitfires which 
attacked HESS Battery at 0620 just before our 
men were due to attack. This assistance was 
successful and the attack was made immediately 
our aircraft had finished. The CP of this Battery 
was in a Lighthouse close by which had been 
attacked by two Spitfires at first light. The 
landing on the Beach 1½ miles to the West of 
Dieppe (GREEN Beach) was also successful, 
capturing the RDF station and destroying their 
other objectives. 
 38. The Eastern flank (BLUE Beach) initial 
attack had, however, failed. A second attack 
made at approximately 0740 resulted in a small 
penetration, which, however, did not succeed 
in silencing the guns on the Eastern Headland. 
In the main landing on Red and White Beaches 
the tanks were held up by the inability of the 
Engineers to land the explosives necessary to 
blast a passage through the promenade wall, 
with the result that the majority of the tanks were 
stranded, and the infantry were disembarked 
whilst the tanks were still immobilised. Large 
white houses overlooking the Beaches gave 
considerable trouble and bombardment by 
destroyers was requested from our troops 
ashore. 
(0605 hours) 39. In view of these difficulties 
a further smoke screen was called for on the 
Eastern Headland “BISMARK” but no aircraft 
were immediately available for this. The smoke 
carrying aircraft were at once ordered to load up 
with smoke bombs and take off as soon as they 
were ready. 
(0621 hours) 40. Earlier attacks had failed 
to silence the Eastern Headland defences and the 
gun positions (HITLER and GOERING) South of 
Dieppe continued to shell the Beaches.
(0605-0615 hours) 41. Twelve Bostons 
had already been ordered off to bomb HITLER 
and were quickly airborne. 
(0640-0645 hours) 42. ROMMEL was 
also still giving trouble and the landing on BLUE 
Beach had in consequence failed. The only 
remaining Bostons were, therefore, detailed to 
attack ROMMEL followed by a further 6 when 
they became available. 
(0723 hours) All these Batteries continued to 
harass our troops and an attack was called for 
on BISMARK. A Squadron of Cannon Hurricanes 
had already been dispatched to be “on call” to 
the Headquarters Ship by 0740 and a second 
Squadron of Cannon Hurricanes was despatched 
to be “on call” to the Headquarters Ship 20 
minutes later.
 43. Thus at the end of the second phase 
the RDF Station, 5 light AA positions had been 
captured and the gun battery behind the ORANGE 
Beach had been demolished. Throughout this 
period air cover was afforded to the troops 
against moderate enemy fighter opposition; the 
number of enemy aircraft patrolling the area at 
any one time during this period did not exceed 
one Squadron. 
Phase 3  (0730 – 1050 hours)
(0730 hours) This third phase covers the 
withdrawal to the Beaches.
(0752 hours) 45. At 0752 two Cannon 
Hurricane Squadrons were ordered to engage 
enemy E-boats which had been reported 
proceeding south from BOULOGNE. Two 
fighter cover Squadrons accompanied these 
Hurricanes. At the same time a message was 
received cancelling the support on “BISMARK” 
and “ROMMEL”. The Air Force Commander was 
always doubtful whether this latter message 
was genuine, but had to act on it as information 
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was received within a few minutes that a second 
landing in BLUE Beach had been successful. 
At this time one Bomber Squadron was on its 
way to bomb ROMMEL and was beyond range 
of recall. Aircraft were also on their way to drop 
smoke bombs on the Eastern Headland; these 
were recalled. 
(0830 hours) 46. T h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a d 
meanwhile deteriorated on the Western flank. 
Heavy opposition was also coming from the 
Western Headland and the houses behind the 
beach. Machine gunning and shelling continued 
undiminished from the Headland and from 
“HINDENBURG”. (0916 hours)
(0926 hours) 47. A Squadron of Hurricane 
Bombers and a Squadron of Cannon Fighters 
covered by two Spitfire Squadrons were ordered 
to attack these positions. 
(0940 hours) 48. The situation in various 
areas continued to grow critical and due to 
various delays the time scheduled for the 
evacuation was deferred from 1030 hours to 
1100 hours. 
(0956 hours) 49. At 0956 the following 
reply was received to the Air Force Commander’s 
request for a situation report:
“Situation too obscure to give useful report. Air 
co-operation faultless. Enemy air opposition now 
increasing. Have you any questions.”
(1004 hours) 50. A few minutes later a 
request was received for a 30 minute smoke 
screen along RED and WHITE Beaches from 
1100 to 1130 hours: Thruxton was ordered to 
prepare as many aircraft as possible with SCI and 
as many aircraft as could be fitted were ordered 
off for this purpose. The Military Commander 
gave GREEN Beach third priority after RED and 
WHITE Beaches for smoke, and 3 Blenheims with 
an escort Squadron were detailed to this task. 
 51. At 1039 hours a request was made for 
maximum fighter support against machine gun 
positions on both Headlands. 
(1039 hours) 52. Four Close Support 
Squadrons were ordered to these attacks with 
two Squadrons as cover. 
(1047 hours) 53. A further call for support 
against the Headland came in 20 minutes later, 
by which time Squadrons were already on their 
way. At this time it appeared that the LCAs were 
arriving at WHITE Beach, ready to re-embark 
the forces on shore. Thus at the beginning of 
this third period the right wing of our landing 
Pilots of Canada’s No.401 Squadron group themselves around Air Marshal A.M. Bishop during his visit to
the unit in September 1942 to congratulate them on their performance during the Dieppe operation.
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forces had made progress but those in the centre 
including the tanks were held up. 
 54. Enemy air opposition had by now 
increased considerably, 20 to 30 fighters being 
seen continuously in the area until 1000 hours 
when enemy bombers appeared escorted by 
fighters.
(1050 hours)  55. The enemy employed 
a considerable number of bombers from 
aerodromes in Holland in addition to small 
numbers from BEAUVAIS. To counter this 
increased enemy activity and in order to cover 
re-embarkation, which was about to commence, 
the strength of fighter cover over DIEPPE 
was increased from 3 to 6, and at times to 9 
Squadrons. Heavy casualties were inflicted on 
the enemy bombers who were now concentrating 
on shipping and landing craft. 
Phase 4  (1050 – 1410 hours)
 56. The fourth phase marks the withdrawal 
from the Beaches. During this time the gun 
batteries BISMARK and HINDENBERG on the 
East and West Headlands continued their intense 
bombardments, and in many areas the situation 
was more than critical. 
 57. Until the expedition had safely withdrawn, 
frequent and urgent requests were received for 
bombing and close support attacks in enemy 
gun positions, and calls for smoke screens were 
made. 
 58. At 1030 hours a most successful pre-
arranged attack was made by 24 Fortress 
Bombers escorted by four Spitfire IX Squadrons, 
on the enemy Fighter aerodrome at ABBEVILLE-
DRUCAT. Some twenty-five tons of high explosives 
and a large number of incendiaries were dropped. 
Many bursts were seen in the North West 
dispersal areas and on the run-ways whilst fires 
were started in woods adjoining the dispersal 
areas. Bursts were also observed on storage sites 
and clouds of black smoke were seen rising from 
the whole target area. This very accurate bombing 
of dispersal areas and run-ways – bombs fell near 
to at least 16 aircraft in those areas – caused 
considerable confusion to the enemy, and he was 
denied the use of his aerodrome for probably 
2 hours, his aircraft being instructed to land 
at alternatives. The ABBEVILLE control was 
out of action until the evening, when a new and 
unfamiliar voice came on the air. 
 59. This attack on Abbeville was followed by 
a diversionary feint made towards OSTEND by 
a Typhoon Wing in an endeavour to draw enemy 
Air Forces away from Dieppe. 
(1100 hours)  60. The enemy air activity by 
this time had increased and he had altered his 
Flight Sgt. Mehew Zobell, brought this Spitfire back safely home after the Dieppe affair despite the fact that his forehead 
had been injured - not seriously - by an exploding cannon shell from an enemy fighter. The holes which the shell made in 
the cowling of his cockpit are clearly visible. In the other picture, the severe damage to his rudder can be seen. Despite 
this he made a perfect landing. His only complaint was that the medical officer would not allow him to fly during the rest 
of the day. “I missed a lot of fun,” he said bitterly.
C
FP
U
 P
L 
10
62
9
C
FP
U
 P
L 
10
63
0
13
Leigh-Mallory: Air Operations at Dieppe
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003
68
form of attack. The tactics of our fighter cover 
were changed to meet this situation by adding a 
high Squadron of Spitfire IXs at 23,000 feet.
(1200 hours) 61. Dur ing  th i s  per iod 
bombing attacks were made by Boston Squadrons 
on BISMARK and HINDENBURG. 
 62. Further attacks were also made by three 
Close Support Squadrons and smoke was laid 
between the East and West Headlands across the 
port of DIEPPE to cover the final withdrawal. 
 63. The constant requests for bombing, 
close support and smoke were met to the limit, 
demands frequently being anticipated as a result 
of the clear picture available in the Fighter Control 
Room and Uxbridge. All types of Squadrons were 
called on to operate a shuttle service. 
 64. It was decided that Tactical Reconnaissance 
aircraft could serve no further useful purpose and 
their operational flights were discontinued.
 65. In the final withdrawal a maximum effort 
was directed to protect our re-embarking forces 
from both ground and air attack. 
(1310 hours)  66.  By 1310 hours it ap-
peared doubtful whether any more troops could 
be evacuated. An hour later the last craft was 
reported 3 miles from the French Coast. The 
withdrawal from DIEPPE had been completed. 
Phase 5  (1410 – 2245 hours)
 67. As our forces cleared the enemy coast 
smoke-laying aircraft laid a protective screen 
between them and the enemy’s defences.
 68. The Typhoon Wing was then reinforcing 
our Spitfires in intercepting enemy bombers 
coming from the direction of Holland. 
(1428 hours) 69. F i g h t e r  C o v e r  w a s 
maintained throughout the long voyage home. 
(1545 hours) 70. There was considerable 
deterioration in the weather and the enemy took 
advantage of the increasing cloud cover to send 
out single bombers to attack our ships as they 
neared the English Coast. One or two formations 
of FW 190s were also employed for this purpose. 
In addition to standing cover over the returning 
convoy, 86 interception sorties were made. 
Appreciation of the
Enemy’s Air Effort
 71. The enemy reacted almost as had been 
foreseen; at first he did not appear to appreciate 
the scale of our effort and he used only 25/30 
fighters in each sortie. As the day went on the 
strength of his sorties increased to between 
50/100 aircraft. At first fighter bombers, and 
later, when the moves from Holland had been 
effected, night bombers in increasing numbers 
were used until all his resources on the Western 
Front were in action. 
 72. Early in the day enemy air effort was 
confined entirely to fighters patrolling the area 
in small numbers. Occasionally dive attacks on 
our ships were made from height. The German 
control merely instructed his aircraft to go to 
the DIEPPE area where large numbers of British 
bombers and fighters were operating. 
 73. It was not until about 1000 hours, some 
six hours after our assault, that our patrols 
encountered enemy bombers. It would seem, 
therefore, that these had not been at a high state 
of readiness. 
 74. The first bombers came in small numbers 
and were escorted by FW 190s. Later larger 
formations up to 15 in number operated under 
the main German Fighter Force which was 
engaging our cover patrols. Reports from pilots 
indicate that a small number of reserve training 
bombers were included. 
 75. The German Bomber Force throughout 
confined its attentions to our convoy and did not 
harass our troops ashore. A bomber jettisoning 
its bombs crippled HMS Berkeley shortly before 
1300 hours. She was later sunk by our own 
forces. 
 The attack on ABBEVILLE – DRUCAT at 1030 
hours was undoubtedly successful in striking 
at the enemy’s most congested aerodrome at 
a critical period in the operation. This attack 
was timed and prearranged to this end and it 
undoubtedly succeeded in considerable reducing 
the efforts of the GAF against our expedition. 
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Casualties
 76. Details concerning air effort, serviceability 
of aircraft, casualties to aircraft and personnel 
and results achieved by the Air Forces during 
operations at Dieppe are shown in Appendix “C” 
to this report.
 77. The very low rate of casualties suffered 
in all types of Squadrons during each intensive 
daylight operation in close support of a combined 
expedition are of particular interest.
Administration
 78. The concentration and redisposition 
of Air Forces in No. 11 Group was for security 
reasons undertaken as a reinforcing exercise, 
under the title of VENOM.
 79. No serious administrative difficulties were 
experienced throughout the operation, though the 
shortness of the period of activity did not perhaps 
bring to light some of the difficulties which might 
have arisen had it been more prolonged. 
Communications
 80. Communications on the whole were 
excellent. Signals were promptly and clearly 
received at Uxbridge. The majority of outgoing 
messages from Uxbridge to the Headquarters 
Ship retransmitted by Portsmouth, did not reach 
the Military Commander afloat, so that requests 
for Close Support from the Ship were often 
repeated unnecessarily. 
 81. The Control organisation in the Ships 
worked very efficiently and this system is capable 
of further expansion and development.
 82. Additional land line links to Uxbridge 
for the operation worked fairly satisfactorily, 
although some of the temporary lines were not 
up to the high standard necessary. 
 83. The operat ions and Intel l igence 
Teleprinter Operators worked at high pressure 
but were able to handle the traffic without serious 
delays. 
Conclusions
 84. (i) This operation showed that such 
expeditions can be successfully supported and 
protected by home defence Fighters operated by 
the normal Home Defence Fighter Organization, 
assisted by forward direction through R/T in 
ships. This efficient organization is fully capable 
of so operating Air Forces to the limit of present 
fighter range and is bound to be superior to any 
alternative forward control scheme which could 
never provide anything like equal facilities. 
(ii) Landings on such a scale in occupied territory 
in daylight effectively pin the enemy air forces 
to an area enabling our supporting Fighters to 
operate at height and in conditions best suited 
to them. In existing circumstances the enemy is 
forced to employ his night bombers in daylight, 
at times unescorted by fighters thus sacrificing an 
appreciable part of his limited bomber resources. 
 (iii) Close Support attacks by Cannon 
Fighters are effective only whilst they are engaging 
their targets, but they have no lasting material 
effect on well protected defensive positions. 
they are extravagant in as much as each aircraft 
is in action for a few seconds only. To achieve 
any lasting moral effect would demand such 
a large expenditure of these Fighters that our 
efforts in other directions would be reduced to 
unacceptable proportions. 
(iv) A very much higher standard of interservice 
recognition is essential in combined operations. 
As modern aircraft are all so alike, it is imperative 
that all personnel have a very thorough knowledge 
of and frequent practice in recognition. 
(v) Airborne smoke is extremely valuable in 
combined Operations. Smoke is often likely to 
have better effect than bombing, particularly if it 
is intended to protect surface forces against well 
placed gun positions. It is essential, however, 
to speed up the present rate of turn round for 
smoke carrying aircraft and to be able quickly to 
alternate between SCI and bombs and to change 
over from one to the other on the ground in the 
shortest possible time. 
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(vi) Some difficulty was experienced at times in
obtaining detailed target requirements from the
Headquarters Ship. This problem of locating and
selecting suitable targets for Air attacks, together
with methods for defining, to the Air Force
Commander required careful interservice study
so that the Air effort is always profitably
employed.
Certain major conclusions together with my
recommendations for awards are being
forwarded by me in a separate letter.
T. Leigh-Mallory
Air Marshal
Air Force Commander
Appendix C
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